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Thank you for this invitation, and thank you, in particular, Professor Ha-
thaway,' for your work in the national security legal field. Since we first met last
fall, I have appreciated your scholarship and our growing friendship. I was
pleased to welcome you to the Pentagon in December to introduce you to a
number of my civilian and military colleagues there. I would like to count on
you as someone with whom I can consult from time to time on the very diffi-
cult legal issues we wrestle with in national security.
I am a student of history and, as you will hear throughout my remarks to-
night, I like to try to put things in the broader perspective.
I have been General Counsel of the Department of Defense now for exactly
three years and twelve days, having been appointed to that position by Presi-
dent Obama on February io, 2009. I have been on an incredible journey with
Barack Obama for longer than that, over five years, going back to November
2006, when he recruited me to the presidential campaign he was about to
launch. I remember thinking then, "This is a long-shot, but it will be exciting,
historic, and how many times in my life will someone personally ask me to help
him become President?" For the young people here, no matter your political
affiliation, I can tell you that involvement in a presidential campaign was excit-
ing-not for the chance to personally interact with the candidate or help devel-
op his positions on issues; the best experiences were canvassing door to door
with my kids in northwest Des Moines and northeast Philadelphia; personally
observing the Iowa caucus take place in a high school cafeteria; and passing out
leaflets at the train station in my hometown of Montclair, New Jersey. Involve-
* General Counsel, Department of Defense, 2009-2012. This Essay is a reprint of Mr.
Johnson's Dean's Lecture at Yale Law School delivered on February 22, 2012.
1. Oona A. Hathaway is the Gerard C. and Bernice Latrobe Smith Professor of In-
ternational Law and Director of the Center for Global Legal Challenges at Yale
Law School.
141
YALE LAW & POLICY REVIEW
ment in the Obama campaign in 2007-2oo8 was one of the highlights of my per-
sonal life.
Involvement in the Obama Administration has been the highlight of my
professional life. Day to day, the job I occupy is all at once interesting, challeng-
ing, and frustrating. But, when I take a step back and look at the larger picture, I
realize that I have witnessed many transformative events in national security
over the last three years.
We have focused our efforts on al Qaeda and put that group on a path to
defeat. We found bin Laden. Scores of other senior members of al Qaeda have
been killed or captured. We have taken the fight to al Qaeda: where they plot,
where they meet, where they plan, and where they train to export terrorism to
the United States. Though the fight against al Qaeda is not over, and multiple
arms of our government remain vigilant in the effort to hunt down those who
want to do harm to Americans, counterterrorism experts state publicly that al
Qaeda's senior leadership is today severely crippled and degraded. Thanks to
the extraordinary sacrifices of our men and women in uniform, we have res-
ponsibly ended the combat mission in Iraq. We are making significant progress
in Afghanistan and have begun a transition to Afghan-led responsibility for se-
curity there. We have applied the standards of the Army Field Manual to all in-
terrogations conducted by the federal government in the context of armed con-
flict.' We worked with the Congress to bring about a number of reforms to
military commissions, reflected in the Military Commissions Act of 20o9 and
the new Manual for Military Commissions. 4 By law, use of statements obtained
by cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment-what was once the most contro-
versial aspect of military commissions-is now prohibited. We are working to
make that system a more transparent one by reforming the rules for press access
to military commission proceedings, establishing closed circuit TV, and a new
public website for the commissions system.' We have ended "Don't Ask, Don't
Tell," which I discussed the last time I was here.' Finally, we have, in these times
of fiscal austerity, embarked upon a plan to transform the military to a more
agile, flexible, rapidly deployable and technologically advanced force, which in-
2. Exec. Order No. 13,491, 74 Fed. Reg. 4893 (Jan. 27, 2009), http://www.whitehouse
.gov/the-press-office/EnsuringLawfullnterrogations.
3. Pub. L. No. 111-84, § 1802, 123 Stat. 2574, 2575 (2009) (codified as amended at io
U.S.C. § 948b(c) (2012)).
4. Manual for Military Commissions: United States, DEP'T OF DEFENSE (2010),
http://www.defense.gov/news/d201Omanual.pdf.
5. Office of Military Commissions, MILITARY COMMISSIONs, http://www.mc.mil
(last visited Dec. 1, 2012).
6. Don't Ask, Don't Tell Repeal Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-321 (repealing io U.S.C. §
654).
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volves reducing the size of the active duty Army and Marine Corps and the de-
fense budget by $487 billion over ten years.7
Perhaps the best part of my job is that I work in the national security field
with, truly, some of the best and brightest lawyers in the country. In this illu-
strious and credentialed group, I often ask myself "how did I get here?" Many in
this group are graduates of this law school: my special assistant and Navy re-
servist Brodi Kemp, who is here with me today (class of '04); Caroline Krass at
Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) (class of '93); Dan Koffsky at OLC (class of'78);
Marty Lederman, formerly of OLC (class of '88); Greg Craig, the former White
House Counsel (class of '72); Bob Litt, General Counsel of Office of the Direc-
tor of National Intelligence (class of '76); Retired Marine Colonel Bill Lietzau
(class of '89); Beth Brinkman at the Department of Justice (class of '85); Sarah
Cleveland, formerly at State Legal (class of '92); David Pozen at State Legal
(class of 'o8); Steve Pomper (class of '93), and my Deputy Bob Easton (class of
'90). I also benefit from working with a number of Yale law students as part of
my office's internship and externship programs.
Last, but not least, your former Dean. Like many in this room, I count my-
self a student of Harold Koh. Within the Obama Administration, Harold often
reminds us of many of the things Barack Obama campaigned on in 2007-2008.
As I wrote these remarks, I asked myself to settle on the one theme from the
2008 campaign that best represents what Harold has carried forward in his posi-
tion as lawyer for the State Department. The answer was easy: "The United
States must lead by the power of our example and not by the example of our
power.
There have been press reports that, occasionally, Harold and I, and other
lawyers within the Obama Administration, disagree from time to time on na-
tional security legal issues.' I confess, this is true, but it is also true that we ac-
tually agree on issues most of the time. The public should be reassured, not
alarmed, to learn there is occasional disagreement and debate among lawyers
within the executive branch of government.
From 2001 to 2004, while I was in private practice in New York City, I also
chaired the Judiciary Committee of the New York City Bar Association, which
rates all the nominees and candidates for federal, state, and local judicial office
in New York City. In June 2002, our bar committee was in the awkward posi-
tion of rejecting the very first candidate the new mayor's judicial screening
committee had put forth for the family court in New York City. On very short
notice, I was summoned to City Hall for a meeting with Mayor Michael
Bloomberg and the chair of his judicial screening committee, who was called on
to defend his committee's recommendation of the judge. The mayor wanted to
7. See Lisa Daniel & Karen Parris, Budget Proposal Requests Smaller, More Modern,
Agile Force, AM. FORCES PRESS SERv., Feb. 13, 2012, http://www.defense.gov
/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=67167.
8. See, e.g., Charlie Savage, At White House, Weighing Limits of Terror Fight, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 15, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/20H/o9/16/us/white-house-weighs
-limits-of-terror-fight.html.
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know why our committees had come out differently. The meeting was extreme-
ly awkward, but I'll never forget what Mayor Bloomberg said to us: "If you guys
always agree, somebody's not doing their job."
Knowing that we must subject our national security legal positions to other
very smart lawyers, who will scrutinize and challenge them, has made us all
work a lot harder to develop and refine those positions. On top of that, our
clients are sophisticated consumers of legal advice. The President, the Vice Pres-
ident, the National Security Adviser, the Vice President's National Security Ad-
viser, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of Ho-
meland Security are themselves all lawyers. They are not engaged in the practice
of law, but in the presentation to them of our legal advice, any weakness in the
logic chain will be seized upon and questioned immediately, usually with a
statement that begins with the ominous preface, "I know I'm not supposed to
play lawyer here, but.. ..
By contrast, "group think" among lawyers is dangerous, because it makes
us lazy and complacent in our thinking and can lead to bad results. Likewise,
shutting your eyes and ears to the legal dissent and concerns of others can lead
to disastrous consequences.
Before I was confirmed by the Senate for this job, Senator Carl Levin, the
chairman of the Armed Services Committee, made sure that I read the commit-
tee's November 2008 report on the treatment and interrogation of detainees at
Guantdnamo. 9
The report chronicles the failure of my predecessor in the Bush Adminis-
tration to listen to the objections of the Judge Advocate General (JAG) leader-
ship about enhanced interrogation techniques, the result of which was that the
legal opinion of one lieutenant colonel, without more, carried the day as the le-
gal endorsement for stress positions, the removal of clothing, and the use of
phobias to interrogate detainees at Guantdnamo Bay."o
Just before becoming President, Barack Obama told his transition team that
the rule of law should be one of the cornerstones of national security in his
Administration. In retrospect, I believe that President Obama made a conscious
decision three years ago to bring into his Administration a group of strong law-
yers who would reflect differing points of view. And, though it has made us all
work a lot harder, I believe that over the last three years, the President has bene-
fited from healthy and robust debate among the lawyers on his national security
team, which has resulted in carefully delineated, pragmatic, credible, and sus-
tainable judgments on some very difficult legal issues in the counterterrorism
realm-judgments that, for the most part, are being accepted within the main-
stream legal community and the courts.
This afternoon, I want to summarize for you, in this one speech, some of
the basic legal principles that form the basis for the U.S. military's counterter-
9. See S. COMM. ON ARMED SERVS., 110TH CONG., INQUIRY INTO THE TREATMENT OF
DETAINEES IN U.S. CUSTODY (Nov. 20, 2o8).
10. Id.
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rorism efforts against al Qaeda and its associated forces. These are principles
with which the top national security lawyers in our Administration broadly
agree. My comments are general in nature about the U.S. military's legal au-
thority, and I do not comment on any operation in particular.
First, in the conflict against an unconventional enemy such as al Qaeda, we
must consistently apply conventional legal principles. We must apply, and we
have applied, the law of armed conflict, including applicable provisions of the
Geneva Conventions and customary international law, core principles of dis-
tinction and proportionality, historical precedent, and traditional principles of
statutory construction. Put another way, we must not make it up to suit the
moment. Against an unconventional enemy that observes no borders and does
not play by the rules, we must guard against aggressive interpretations of our
authorities that will discredit our efforts, provoke controversy, and invite chal-
lenge. As I told the Heritage Foundation last October, overreaching with mili-
tary power can result in national security setbacks, not gains." Particularly,
when we attempt to extend the reach of the military onto U.S. soil, the courts
resist, consistent with our core values and our American heritage-reflected, no
less, in places such as the Declaration of Independence, the Federalist Papers,
the Third Amendment, and in the 1878 federal criminal statute, still on the
books today, which prohibits willfully using the military as a posse comitatus un-
less expressly authorized by Congress or the Constitution."
Second, in the conflict against al Qaeda and its associated forces, the be-
drock of the military's domestic legal authority continues to be the Authoriza-
tion for the Use of Military Force passed by Congress one week after 9/11.' The
AUMF, as it is often called, is Congress's authorization to the President to
use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organiza-
tions, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or
aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or har-
bored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future
acts of international terrorism against the United States by such na-
tions, organizations or persons. 4
Ten years later, the AUMF remains on the books and it is still a viable authori-
zation today.
In the detention context, we in the Obama Administration have interpreted
this authority to include "those persons who were part of, or substantially sup-
ported, Taliban or al-Qaida forces or associated forces that are engaged in hos-
11. See Jeh Johnson, Is More Detainee Legislation Needed?, HERITAGE FOUND. (Oct. 18,
2011), http://www.heritage.org/events/20i/lo/jeh-johnson.
12. See Army Appropriations Act, ch. 263, § 15, 20 Stat. 145, 152 (1878) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2012)).
13. Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note).
14. Id.
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tilities against the United States or its coalition partners."" This interpretation
of our statutory authority has been adopted by the courts in the habeas cases
brought by Guantinamo detainees." In 2011, Congress joined the executive and
judicial branches of government in embracing this interpretation when it codi-
fied it almost word-for-word in Section 1021 of this year's National Defense Au-
thorization Act, 7 ten years after enactment of the original AUMF. (A point
worth noting here: contrary to some reports, neither Section 1021, nor any other
detainee-related provision in this year's Defense Authorization Act, creates or
expands upon the authority for the military to detain a U.S. citizen.)
But, the AUMF, the statutory authorization from 2001, is not open ended.
It does not authorize military force against anyone the executive labels a "ter-
rorist." Rather, it encompasses only those groups or people with a link to the
terrorist attacks on 9/11 or associated forces.
Nor is the concept of an "associated force" an open-ended one, as some
suggest. This concept, too, has been upheld by the courts in the detention con-
text,'8 and it is based on the well-established concept of cobelligerency in the
law of war. The concept has become more relevant over time, as al Qaeda has,
over the last ten years, become more decentralized and relies more on associates
to carry out its terrorist aims. An "associated force," as we interpret the phrase,
has two characteristics: (i) it is an organized, armed group that has entered the
fight alongside al Qaeda, and (2) it is a cobelligerent with al Qaeda in hostilities
against the United States or its coalition partners. In other words, the group
must not only be aligned with al Qaeda. It must have also entered the fight
against the United States or its coalition partners. Thus, an "associated force" is
not any terrorist group in the world that merely embraces the al Qaeda ideolo-
gy. More is required before we draw the legal conclusion that the group fits
within the statutory authorization for the use of military force passed by the
Congress in 2001.
Third, there is nothing in the wording of the 2001 AUMF or its legislative
history that restricts this statutory authority to the "hot" battlefields of Afghan-
istan. Afghanistan was plainly the focus when the authorization was enacted in
September 2001, but the AUMF authorized the use of necessary and appropriate
15. See Respondent's Memorandum Regarding the Government's Detention Authori-
ty Relative to Detainees Held at Guantanamo Bay, In re Guantanamo Bay Detai-
nee Litig., Misc. No. o8-0442, at 2 (D.D.C. March 13, 2009), http://www.justice
.gov/opaldocuments/memo-re-det-auth.pdf.
16. See, e.g., Al-Adahi v. Obama, 613 F-3d 1102, 1103 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S.
Ct. 1oo1 (2o1); Awad v. Obama, 608 F.3d 1, 11-12 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131
S. Ct. 1814 (2011).
17. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. 112-81, 125 Stat.
1298 (2011).
18. See, e.g., Barhoumi v. Obama, 609 F.3d 416, 432 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Hamlily v. Ob-
ama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63, 74-75 (D.D.C. 2009); Gherebi v. Obama, 609 F. Supp. 2d
43, 69 (D.D.C. 2009).
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force against the organizations and persons connected to the September iith at-
tacks-al Qaeda and the Taliban-without a geographic limitation. The legal
point is important because, in fact, over the last ten years, al Qaeda has not only
become more decentralized, it has also, for the most part, migrated away from
Afghanistan to other places where it can find safe haven.
However, this legal conclusion too has its limits. It should not be inter-
preted to mean that we believe that we are in any "Global War on Terror," or
that we can use military force whenever we want, wherever we want. Interna-
tional legal principles, including respect for a state's sovereignty and the laws of
war, impose important limits on our ability to act unilaterally, and on the way
in which we can use force in foreign territories.
Fourth, I want to spend a moment on what some people refer to as "tar-
geted killing." Here, I will largely repeat Harold's much-quoted address to the
American Society of International Law in March 2010.'9 In an armed conflict,
lethal force against known, individual members of the enemy is a longstanding
and long-legal practice. What is new is that, with advances in technology, we are
able to target military objectives with much more precision, to the point where
we can identify, target, and strike a single military objective from great dis-
tances.
Should the legal assessment of targeting a single identifiable military objec-
tive be any different in 2012 than it was in 1943, when the U.S. Navy targeted
and shot down over the Pacific the aircraft flying Admiral Yamamoto, the
commander of the Japanese navy during World War 1I, with the specific intent
of killing him? Should we take a dimmer view of the legality of lethal force di-
rected against individual members of the enemy because modern technology
makes our weapons more precise? As Harold stated two years ago, the rules that
govern targeting do not turn on the type of weapons system used, and there is
no prohibition under the law of war on the use of technologically advanced
weapons systems in armed conflict, so long as they are employed in conformity
with the law of war.2 0 Advanced technology can ensure both that the best intel-
ligence is available for planning operations, and that civilian casualties are mi-
nimized in carrying out such operations.
On occasion, I read or hear a commentator loosely refer to lethal force
against a valid military objective with the pejorative term "assassination." Like
any American shaped by national events in 1963 and 1968, the term is to me one
of the most repugnant in our vocabulary, and it should be rejected in this con-
text. Under well-settled legal principles, lethal force against a valid military ob-
jective in an armed conflict is consistent with the law of war and does not, by
definition, constitute an "assassination."
19. Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep't of State, The Obama Administra-
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Fifth, as I stated at the public meeting of the ABA Standing Committee on
Law and National Security, belligerents who also happen to be U.S. citizens do
not enjoy immunity where noncitizen belligerents are valid military objectives."
Reiterating principles from Ex Parte Quirin in 1942," the Supreme Court in
2004 in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld stated that a "citizen, no less than an alien, can be
part of or supporting forces hostile to the United States or coalition partners
and engaged in an armed conflict against the United States.""
Sixth, contrary to the view of some, targeting decisions are not appropriate
for submission to a court. In my view, they are core functions of the executive
branch, and often require real-time decisions based on an evolving intelligence
picture that only the executive branch may timely possess. I agree with Judge
Bates of the federal district court in Washington, who ruled in 2010 that the
judicial branch of government is simply not equipped to become involved in
targeting decisions. 4 As I stated earlier in this address, within the executive
branch, the views and opinions of the lawyers on the President's national secu-
rity team are debated and heavily scrutinized; a legal review of the application of
lethal force is the weightiest judgment a lawyer can make. (When these judg-
ments start to become easy, it will be time for me to return to private law prac-
tice.)
Finally, as a student of history, I believe that those who govern today must
ask ourselves how we will be judged ten, twenty, or fifty years from now. Our
applications of law must stand the test of time, because, over the passage of
time, what we find tolerable today may be condemned in the permanent pages
of history tomorrow.
I'm going to tell one more story. There's a movie out now called Red Tails
that reminds us all about the exploits and courage of the famed Tuskegee air-
men of World War II." In March 1945, about one hundred Tuskegee Airmen
were sent to train at Freeman Field in Indiana. At the time, Army Regulation
210-10 prohibited segregated officers' clubs in the Army. Determined to contin-
ue a system of segregation despite this rule, the base commander devised two
different officers' clubs: one for all the Tuskegee airmen "instructors" (all of
whom happened to be white), and another for the Tuskegee airmen "trainees"
(all of whom happened to be black). Over the course of two days in April 1945,
sixty-one Tuskegee airmen were arrested for challenging the segregated clubs, in
what is now known in the history books as the "Freeman Field Mutiny." Several
days later, all the Tuskegee airmen on the base were rounded up, read the base
21. Jeh C. Johnson, Speech to the ABA Committee on Law and National Security
(September io, 2009), in 31 AM. BAR. Ass'N NAT'L SEc. L. REP. 15 (2009), http://
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/national-securityjaw
report/volume31_issuei.authcheckdam.pdf.
22. 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
23. 542 U.S. 507, 519 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted).
24. See Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010).
25. RED TAILS (Twentieth Century FOX 2012).
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regulation, and told to sign a certification that they had read it and understood
it. Every one of them refused to sign. Next, with the legal help of a JAG from
First Air Force, every Tuskegee airman on base was interviewed one-by-one in
the base legal office and given three choices: (i) sign the certification, (2) write
and sign your own certification, or (3) be arrested for disobeying a direct order.
Almost all of them, again, refused to sign."
As a result, my uncle, Second Lieutenant Robert B. Johnson, and over one
hundred other Tuskegee airmen became detainees of the U.S. military, arrested
and charged with a violation of Article 64 of the Articles of War-disobeying a
direct order in a time of war-a capital offense. Eventually, once the public
learned of the episode, the Tuskegee airmen were released, but Lt. Johnson was
denied the opportunity to serve in combat and given a letter of reprimand from
the U.S. Army.
My legal colleagues and I who serve in government today will not surrender
to the national security pressures of the moment. History shows that, under the
banner of "national security," much damage can be done-to human beings, to
our laws, to our credibility, and to our values. As I have said before, we must
adopt legal positions that comport with common sense and fit well within the
mainstream of legal thinking in the area, consistent with who we are as Ameri-
cans.
I have talked today about legally sustainable and credible ways to wage war,
not to win peace. All of us recognize that this should not be the normal way of
things, and that the world is a better place when the United States does indeed
lead by the power of an example and not by the example of its power.
In addition to my uncle, one of my personal heroes is my former law part-
ner Ted Sorensen, who died a little over a year ago. Ted was John F. Kennedy's
speechwriter, one of his closest advisors, and himself one of the most eloquent
communicators of our time. In May 2004, Ted Sorensen gave one of the best
speeches I've ever heard. It was right after the Abu Ghraib scandal broke. He
said this, which I will never forget:
Last week a family friend of an accused American guard in Iraq recited
the atrocities inflicted by our enemies on Americans and asked: Must
we be held to a different standard? My answer is YES. Not only because
others expect it. We MUST hold ourselves to a different standard. Not
only because God demands it, but because it serves our security. Our
greatest strength has long been not merely our military might but our
moral authority. Our surest protection against assault from abroad has
been not all our guards, gates and guns or even our two oceans, but our
essential goodness as a people. 'I
26. See John D. Murphy, The Freeman Field Mutiny- A Study in Leadership (Mar.
1997) (unpublished research paper, Air Command and Staff College),
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/acsc/97-o429.pdf.
27. Theodore Sorensen, Commencement Address at the New School University (May
21, 2004).
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My goal here this afternoon was to inform and to educate. My other reason
for being here is to appeal directly to the students, to ask that you think about
public service in your career. Law students become trained in the law for many
different reasons, with many different traits and interests. Some are naturally
suited for transactions, to help structure deals. Others want to be in the cour-
troom and love advocacy. There are so many facets of the law-and people who
want to pursue them-that help make our profession great.
Over the years, one of my big disappointments is to see a law student or
young lawyer who went to law school motivated by a desire for public service,
but who gave up the pursuit because of student loans, lack of a readily available
opportunity, or the lure of a large law firm and a large starting salary. To those
law students who are interested in public service, I hope that you do not lose
that interest as your career progresses. We need talented lawyers serving in gov-
ernment at all levels. You will find every day interesting and rewarding, and, in
the end, you and others will assess the sum total of your legal career, not by
what you got, but by what you gave.
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